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Attorney-client PrivilegeAdmission in Legislative Hearings
Joseph Lanza, while in the Westchester County New York
jail, had an interview in the counsel room with his attorney. This
interview was secretly "bugged" by state officers and a tape recording of the communication was made. A New York State Joint
Legislative Committee, with a view towards investigating the
operation of state government, investigated the parole violation of
Lanza. The Committee announced that it was planning to make
public the recording of the interview between Lanza and his at-

19

The Nebraska Department of Insurance has stated that they would look

with disfavor upon an attempt by any insurance company to contract around

the Naphtali rule, should that rule be adopted in Nebraska. Conversation
with Mr. Douce, December 27, 1957.
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torney. Lanza and the attorney brought suit to enjoin the disclosure.
The Supreme Court at Special Term denied a motion to dismiss the
complaint and granted a temporary injunction. The Appellate
Division reversed the temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint. Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.
Under these facts the only issue was whether the complaint stated
sufficient grounds for relief. The Court of Appeals held that there
was no violation of the attorney-client privilege in the proposed
use of the recording and found no grounds to enjoin the Committee
action.1
Appellants claimed that the use and divulgence of the recording
would violate the attorney-client privilege under the New York
Civil Practice Act, sections 353 and 354.
§353 Attorneys and their employees not to disclose communications. An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to
disclose a communication, made by his client to him, or his advice
given thereon, in the course of his professional employment, nor
shall any clerk, stenographer or other person employed by such
attorney or counselor be allowed to disclose any such communication or advice given thereon.
§354 The last three sections apply to any examination of a
person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly
waived....

In finding that there were no grounds for enjoining the Legislature, the court said (1) the statute did not inhibit disclosures by
other persons who overheard the conversation between an attorney
and his client; (2) the statute seals only the lips of the attorney
against testimonial compulsion and neither attorney nor client will
be examined as a witness; and (3) the right to a fair trial is not
, impaired since there is no trial, present or prospective.
According to Wigmore the common law elements of the attorney-client privilege are as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 2
The New York statute merely adopted the common law rule qf the

attorney-client privilege.

·

1 Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Government
Operations, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9, 143 N.E.2d 772 (Ct. of App. May 24, 1957),
cert. denied, 78 S. Ct. 85 (Oct. 21, 1957).
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (3d ed. 1940).
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This section is a mere re-enactment of the common law rule
and it cannot be supposed from the general language used that
it was intended to change or enlarge that rule as it had been
expounded by the courts. s

In comparing the ele:tpents of the privilege to the facts of this case
it is difficult to justify the result reached by the majority.
The court relies first on the rule that the attorney-client
privilege does not inhibit disclosures by other persons who have
overheard the conversation. The court seems to be considering the
tapped conversation as a witness who overheard the confidential
communication. The reason for this rule follows from the basic
concept that the privilege is that of the client. And because it depends on the client, it is up to him to take the necessary precautions
to assure that the communication is not overheard. 4 However, Lanza
had no choice in the facilities available; he made use of the only
place possible to secure professional advice, the counsel room of the
jail. "And the law does not regard it as necessary for the protection
of the client, that his communications should be made to his attorney
under any particular circumstances of injunctions of secrecy."5
A comparable situation occurred in Coplon v. United States. 6
There a telephone conversation between an attorney and client was
tapped by federal agents. The court said that this was a denial of
the effective aid of counsel. Although the court based this holding
on the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, they recognized
the principle underlying the attorney-client privilege.
It is well established that an accused does not enjoy the effective
aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with

him.7

However, there is a New York case which holds that such intercepted communications are admissible as evidence.8 At any rate, the
telephone cases can be distinguished on the ground that the client

3 Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 424, 28 N.E. 651, 652 (1891); Kent
Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Matter of Williams, 179 Misc. 805, 39 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
4 Cary v. White, 59 N.Y. 336 (1906); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2326 (3d ed.
1940).
Ii Wheeler v. Hill, 16 Me. 329, 333 (1839).
G 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
7ld. at 757.
s Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1951). The court
said telephone conversations are not within the privilege, but here the communication was not in good faith but in furtherance of a false reconciliation
in regard to a divorce proceeding.
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could have talked to his attorney face to face if he had wanted to
assure that he was not_ being overheard, and therefore, the rule
governing overheard communications would cover the situation.
But where the client has done all that is possible to preserve the
confidential communication- and it is secretly tape recorded by the
state, the reason for the exception should not apply.
A closer analogy arises when a client delivers a confidential
communication to his attorney by means of a document and that
document is subsequently stolen from the attorney. There is some
authority to the effect that this situation is similar to the case where
a party overhears the conversation and in both cases the burden is
upon the client to see that the disclosure does not occur. However,
the better view seems to be that the information does not lose its
confidential nature.
The principle forbidding its use is not adopted as a mere rule of
professional conduct on the part of the attorney. It confers a right
upon the client for his protection and advantage and which he
alone is authorized to waive. It would not do to hold that the
communication loses its confidential and privileged character if
knowledge thereof can be obtained by means which do not involve
the counsel in a breach of professional duty. 9

This result is justified by analyzing the policy behind the attorneyclient privilege.
It is absolutely necessary that one seeking to prosecute his rights

or to defend himself from an improper claim have recourse
to the assistance of professional lawyers, and it its equally necessary, to use a vulgar phrase, that he should be able to make a
clean breast of it to the gentleman whom he consults with a view
to the prosecution of his claim or substantiating his defense against
the claim of others. He should be able to place unrestricted and
unbounded confidence in the professional agent and the communications he so makes should be kept secret, unless with his
consent; for it is his privilege, and not the privilege of the confidential agent. 10

The same principles are applicable to the case under discussion.
The court, it seems, should have applied the privilege instead of the
rule of the overheard conversation.
Secondly, the court relies on the fact that neither Lanza nor
his attorney are witnesses and that they are not being compelled
to give privileged testimony. However, to have a breach of the
privilege there need be no trial against the client, present or pros-

9

Liggett v. Glen, 51 Fed. 381, 396 (8th Cir. 1892).

10

5 Jones, Evidence

§

2156 (2d ed. 1926).
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pective.11 It likewise follows that the attorney is not allowed to
divulge the communication in a different action not directed against
the client, without the consent of the client.12 To further show the
importance of this principle, there is the rule that the attorney
may not divulge this information even after the client's death without the consent of the client's representatives. 13 The reason behind
these rules is that "there is no limit of time beyond which the disclosures might not be used to the detriment of the client or his
estate."14 In light of these long standing rules it seems that the court
has lost sight of the fundamentals of this privilege.
Furthermore, this reasoning does not follow the comparison
which the Court used in the argument pertaining to a third person
overhearing the communication. There the court was willing to
compare the tape to a witness who overheard the conversation. It
would seem only a slight extension of their prior reasoning to say
that the tape stands in somewhat the same position as Lanza ·if he
were a witness before the Committee and asked to repeat what he
had told his attorney. Would Lanza be compelled by the courts to
disclose this information? The case of New York City Council v.
Goldwater15 illustrates this problem. Certain confidential medical
records were subpoenaed by a New York City investigating committee. Section 354 of the New York Civil Practice Act specifies
that the privilege of clergy, physicians and attorneys applies to
"any examination." In this case it was held that the privilege extended to a legislative hearing when the witness is under subpoena
properly issued. This holding sustains the principle as developed
by law that any disclosure of the confidence without consent is a
violation of the privilege. The court said that the law is to be given
a liberal construction, even though the normal application would be
judicial proceedings. The court also said, "The Legislature which
has conferred the privilege may, if it chooses, limit its application."16
Unless the legislative action of this Committee in the Lanza case
is interpreted as a legislative act limiting its prior act which granted
the privilege, it does not appear that Lanza would be compelled to
testify. There is no indication that the committee intended to limit
its prior act. It therefore seems reasonable that the court in the
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528 (N.Y. 1848).
Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330 (1862).
13 Anderson v. Searles, 93 N.J.L. 227, 107 Atl. 429 (1919); 3 Jones, Evidence
750 (4th ed. 1938).
14 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2323 (3d ed. 1940).
15 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
16 Id. at 302, 31 N.E.2d at 33.
11

12

§
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Lanza case should have held that the use of the recording would
be a violation of the privilege.
The court remarked that it had no power to enjoin the Legislature because it was about a legitimate legislative function. The
question then arises as to just how far a legislature, within a legitimate function, can infringe upon and possibly damage a time
honored rule developed by the courts. When the privilege is claimed
by an attorney or client in court and the privilege is made out, the
court actually stops itself from using the evidence. In some instances
the trial judge has enforced the privilege upon his own motion.17
If this is the case why can the Legislature damage this court developed privilege without interference? Opinion of The Justices in
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire gives some insight into this
problem. 18 The court was considering the ability of the state legislature to make grand jurors disclose proceedings before them during
their regular session. The court said,
It has long been the policy of. the law in furtherance of
justice, that the investigations and deliberations of a grand. jury
should be conducted in secret, and for most intents and purposes,
all its proceedings should be legally sealed against divulgence. 19
It is not considered necessary in aid of the investigatory power
that grand jurors should violate their oath of secrecy. 20

In other words, exercise of the Legislature's investigatory power
in this instance would have destroyed a traditional and vital element
of the judicial process. The same reasoning should apply to the
attorney-client privilege. Although legislative investigations rarely
follow any strict procedure,21 it does seem that the informing actions
of committees can fulfill their purposes without going to the point
of breaking traditional and necessary judicial privileges.
The organization of our government is founded upon the theory
of a separation of powers between the three branches. No one
branch is to usurp the functions of the other.
.. . . the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the
convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary authority. 22

17People v. Atchinson, 40 Cal. 284 (1870); Beilfuss¥. Dinnauer, 174 Wis.
507, 183 N.W. 700 (1921).
1s 96 N.H. 530, 73 A.2d 433 (1950).
19 Id. at 531, 73 A.2d at 435.
20Ibid.
21 Glassie and Cooley, Congressional Investigations-Salvation in Self Regulation, 38 Geo. L. Rev. 343 (1950).
22 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissent).
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This system is one of checks and balances so that no branch will
become dominant and each has certain powers it can exert over the
other. But where the system of checks and balances ends and
obstruction or plain interference begins is difficult to ascertain.
On the federal level the Supreme Court has adopted several selfregulating rules to regulate its power of judicial review. 23 The
executive branch has not allowed Congress, in its investigations,
to violate their rules concerning non-disclosure. On May 17, 1954,
the President sent a letter to a counselor of the Department of the
Army through the Secretary of Defense telling the counselor not
to relate certain facts to the Senate Government Operations Committee. The President stated in the letter that he had done this to
maintain the proper separation of power between the two branches.
The Committee did not pursue the matter further than to accept
the refusal of the counselor to answer under the authority of the
letter. In view of the established doctrine of separation of powers,
the court should have enjoined this disclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The court put too narrow a construction on the statute in deciding this case.
2. The court takes no notice of the policy considerations behind
the privilege and the result is that the holding abrogates these considerations.
3. The court is allowing the Legislature to obstruct and damage
a court developed rule of law, which violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
If the courts will not protect this privilege in such a situation as
this, the decision must be left to the discretion of the Legislature.
The Committee must balance the interests affected by its action.
It must determine whether it is better to do damage to a sacred
privilege established by the courts or to secure the information
sought to further the legislative purpose. Since the contents of the
communication are not known, perhaps the Legislature has already
determined this fact and the legislative purpose is the end to be
achieved in this particular situation. But on the other hand, it is
equally important that the court, in allowing such legislative action,
does not open the door with a decision which will weaken the
privilege and destroy its purpose.

W. C. Nelson, Jr., '60
23

Ribble, Separation of Powers, 6 Va. L. Weekly DICTA Comp. 1 (1955).

